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NOTE
THE SUITABILITY RULE: SHOULD A
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION EXIST?
THE NATURE OF THE SUITABILITY OBLIGATION
In order to promote "just and equitable principles of trade" in
the securities industry,1 the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), and
several national securities exchanges have formulated rules to en-
sure that broker recommendations in securities conform to the
needs and investment objectives of each individual customer.2 The
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, for example, impose upon NASD
members the obligation to recommend only those securities "suita-
ble" for their customers' accounts.3 Likewise, the "know-your-cus-
tomer" rule of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is also
thought to create implied suitability duties for exchange members.4
Furthermore, SEC Rule 15b10-3 provides that nonmember brokers
must have reasonable grounds to believe that their recommenda-
tions are "not unsuitable" to the investor's needs.5
Since the suitability rules which supplement the antifraud
2 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b), 78o-3(b)(4) (1976 & Supp. 11 1979); see REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY
OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION [hereinafter
cited as SPECIAL STUDY], H.R. REP. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1 at 309 (1963).
2 See Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Jenny v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,021, at
97,582 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Avery v. Moffatt, 187 Misc. 576, 592, 55 N.Y.S.2d 215, 228 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1945).
3 NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2, reprinted in [1976] NASD SEC. DEALERS
MANUAL (CCH) 1 2152 19; see text accompanying note 38 infra.
4 See NYSE R. 405, reprinted in 2 N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GumE (CCH) 1 2,405 (1980); Rolf
v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978);
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Buttrey
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 137 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 838 (1969); Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His Customers Under Evolving Federal
Fiduciary and Suitability Standards, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 435, 436 (1977); notes 48-49 and
accompanying text infra.
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1980); see text accompanying note 44 infra.
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provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6 originally were
intended to promote ethical broker conduct, the question has
arisen whether suitability violations, like the antifraud prohibi-
tions, give rise to implied civil liability." It remains unclear, how-
ever, whether a suitability violation is a legal wrong redressable in
a private civil action or merely an ethical breach actionable only in
an administrative proceeding.9 A majority of courts addressing the
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980); note 122 infra.
See Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 95,021, at 97,582 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Avery v. Moffatt, 187 Misc. 576, 592, 55
N.Y.S.2d 215, 228 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945); NASD, Special Report to NASD Members
(Oct. 9, 1964), reprinted in [1976] NASD MANUAL (CCH) 1 2,152, at 2,051; Rediker, Civil
Liability of Broker-Dealers Under SEC and NASD Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. REV. 15,
15-26 (1969).
s See, e.g., Roif v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974); Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1239 (7th Cir. 1969); Hecht v. Harris,
Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 423 (N.D. Cal. 1968). Under the "implied rights" doctrine,
a private litigant may be permitted to maintain a civil suit in federal court even though the
statute from which his substantive rights derive does not expressly grant a private right of
action. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-33 (1964); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
683-84 (1946). In general, the courts have allowed an implied private right of action where
the legislative history of the statute in question indicates that Congress intended to grant
private relief but failed to commit that intent to statutory form. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554-57 (1969); Bossier
Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 851-52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911
(1967); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Accordingly, several
sections of the Securities Exchange Act have been deemed to give rise to an implied private
right of action. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971) (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980)); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964) (15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)). But see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no private right of action under 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976)).
Typically, civil suits by investors based on unsuitable investment recommendations in-
volve a depreciation of the customer's portfolio or depletion of his principal as a result of
speculative trading or "churning" violations by the defendant-broker. For example, in Hecht
v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 423 (N.D. Cal. 1968), the plaintiff, an elderly
woman with a conservative investment outlook, wanted to ensure that her $533,000 account
would yield a guaranteed monthly income for life. Id. at 424-26. She consulted a broker,
therefore, who warranted that he would manage the account in accordance with her invest-
ment objectives so that she would have a steady source of dividend income with no deple-
tion of her invested principal. Id. at 426. During the next 7 years, however, the net income
from the plaintiff's portfolio diminished to approximately $1000 per year. Id. Upon investi-
gation, it was revealed that the defendant had engaged in excessive trading, expending
$232,000 of principal in interest payments and broker commissions, id. at 425, and had spec-
ulated in several high risk securities and commodities. Id. at 427. The investor thereafter
filed suit against the broker and the brokerage firm, alleging that the broker had made
"unsuitable" recommendations in the purchase and sale of his client's securities in violation
of the NYSE and NASD rules. Id. at 426-27.
' Compare Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969) and Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518
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existence of the implied right of action under the suitability rules
have held that unsuitable broker recommendations are actionable
only when the alleged conduct is "tantamount to fraud." 10 Since
suitability claims are often joined with separate allegations of
fraud under rule 10b-5. however, the suitability ground rarely has
been dispositive. Moreover, under the "tantamount to fraud" stan-
dard, the issue of whether the suitability rules give rise to an im-
plied right of action has been rendered academic, because fraudu-
lent conduct in the purchase or sale of securities is generally
redressable under the Act's antifraud provisions.12 Thus, the courts
have not defined adequately a broker's misconduct in making un-
suitable investment recommendations as a basis for implying a pri-
vate remedy. In addition, recent Supreme Court pronouncements
addressing the general issue of implication have construed nar-
rowly the instances in which any implied right of action will be
permissible.13
In view of these considerations, it is clear that the suitability
rules have been the source of great unsettlement in the area of im-
plied broker liability. Initially, therefore, this note will examine the
causes of such unsettlement by setting forth the scheme of cooper-
ative regulation of broker conduct established pursuant to sections
6 and 15A of the Securities Exchange Act. This will be followed by
an explanation of the sources and the extent of a broker's suitabil-
ity duties. The leading cases which have addressed directly the ex-
istence of a private right of action for suitability violations will
then be discussed. Finally, the viability of enforcing a suitability
claim under more traditional antifraud remedies will be analyzed.
The Note will conclude that both the nature of the suitability rules
and recent judicial precedent militate against recognition of an im-
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) and Rotein v. Reynolds & Co., 359 F. Supp. 109, 114 (N.D. IIl. 1973) with
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 166 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Piper,
Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 296-97 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
10 See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 143
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Salwen Paper Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 130, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); McMUllan v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
399 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
1 See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 430 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
22 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 410 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
Is See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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plied federal right of action.
THE SCHEME OF COOPERATIVE SELF-REGULATION
Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,14 the national stock exchanges functioned as unincorporated
associations to provide meeting places for the transaction of busi-
ness among members of the exchange. As a voluntary association,
the exchange was not governed by statute.15 Instead, the exchange
adopted a constitution and bylaws which set forth its own stan-
dards of acceptable member behavior as well as procedures for dis-
ciplinary action.1" Upon admission to the exchange, a member ex-
pressly consents to be bound by these rules and by the decisions of
the governing body charged with their enforcement.17 Tradition-
ally, however, the exchange rules did not serve as a basis for civil
liability, but rather set forth "ethical" standards with which the
members of the exchange agreed to comply.18
Recognizing that direct federal regulation of member conduct
was impracticable,19 Congress perpetuated this policy of exchange
self-administration in the Exchange Act.20 Pursuant to sections 621
1, Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, tit. 1, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ff
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
" See Belton v. Hatch, 109 N.Y. 593, 596, 17 N.E. 223, 226 (1888); Jennings, Self-
Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 29 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 663, 663-67 (1964); Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange
Member: Liability for Violation of Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CALw. L. REv. 1120, 1121 n.2
(1970). By avoiding corporate status, the stock exchanges sought to prevent judicial inter-
ference in the internal affairs of the organization. Jennings, supra, at 663 n.2.
11 See Jennings, supra note 15, at 663 n.2.
7 See Belton v. Hatch, 109 N.Y. 593, 595-97, 17 N.E. 223, 225-27 (1888); Jennings,
supra note 15, at 663 n.2.
18 See Jennings, supra note 15, at 663 n.2.
19 See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, at 309; see Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp.
1376, 1378 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) T 95,021, at 97,582 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Avery v. Moffatt, 187
Misc. 576, 592, 55 N.Y.S.2d 215, 228 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945). See generally Rediker,
supra note 7, at 15-26; Jennings, supra note 15, at 669-70 & n. 46.
20 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976). The Congres-
sional hearings on the scheme of self-regulation proved to be an area of heated debate. See
Stock Exchange Regulations: Hearing on H.R. 7852 Before the House Committe on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 8720, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1934). See generally Jennings, supra note 15, at 669-72.
21 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976). Under section 6 of the Exchange Act, the exchanges must
promulgate and enforce disciplinary rules and procedures as a precondition to registration
with the SEC. Section 6(a)(3) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any exchange may be registered with the Commission as a national securities
exchange under the terms and conditions ... of this title, by filing with the Coin-
[Vol. 55:493
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and 1922 of the '34 Act, national securities exchanges are charged
with the primary responsibility for disciplining any member for
conduct or proceedings "inconsistent with just and equitable prin-
ciples of trade."23 The Commission, on the other hand, is author-
ized to suspend an exchange or its members or officers for viola-
tions of the Act or an SEC Rule,24 and to "abrogate, add to, and
delete from .. .the rules of [the] self-regulatory organization as
[it] deems necessary or appropriate. '25 In practice, however, the
SEC's suspension power has rarely been exercised,2' and the Com-
mission generally plays only a supervisory role in the regulation of
member conduct.2 7 As former chairman William 0. Douglas stated,
"[tihe government would keep the shotgun . . . behind the door,
loaded, well .oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope that it
would never have to be used" 2
8
Although the Exchange Act provided the SEC with supervi-
sory powers over the exchanges, it soon became apparent that reg-
ulation of the over-the-counter dealers remained inadequate.2
Therefore, Senator Maloney proposed an amendment to the Ex-
change Act which was approved by Congress in 1938.30 Enacted as
section 15A,31 the "Maloney Act" provided for the organization
and registration of associations of over-the-counter dealers in a
mission an application for registration in such form as the Commission, by rule,
may prescribe containing the rules of the exchange and such other information
* * * as the Commission... may prescribe as necessary or appropriate ....
15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1976). In addition, § 6(b) of the Act states that an exchange shall not be
registered unless "[t]he rules of the exchange provide that... its members ... shall be
appropriately disciplined for violations of this chapter.. . by expulsion, suspension, limita-
tion of activities, functions, and operations, fine, censure, being suspended or barred from
being associated with a member or any other fitting sanction." Id. § 78f(b)(6) (1976).
22 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976).
23 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1976); see Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
24 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(3) (1976).
25 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1976).
26 2 L. Loss, SEcuRrIEs REGULATION 1171 (2d ed. 1961).
7 See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944);
Bright v. Philadelphia Baltimore Wash. Stock Exch., 327 F. Supp. 495, 502-03 (E.D. Pa.
1971). When an exchange disciplines a member, however, the SEC is authorized to review
administratively the disciplinary proceeding. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2), (e)(1) (1976).
28 W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (Allen ed. 1940).
29 See S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1938). See also United States v. Bloom,
450 F. Supp. 323, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1378-79
(N.D. Tex 1976); 2 L. Loss, supra note 27, at 1359-69; Jennings, supra note 15, at 663.
30 See S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1938).
31 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1976).
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manner similar to that followed by the exchanges under section
6.32 The association which came into being as a result of the Malo-
ney Act is the National Association of Securities Dealers.3s As a
prerequisite to registration with the SEC, the NASD is required to
formulate rules governing selling abuses in order "to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, [and] . . . to pro-
tect investors and the public interest. 3 4 The association also must
include in its rules provisions for disciplining members for viola-
tions of the Exchange Act or the NASD rules themselves. 5 As with
the exchanges, the SEC acts in a supervisory capacity with respect
to NASD activities, reserving the power to relieve the organization
of its duties under the Exchange Act if "consistent with the public
interest [and] the protection of investors."36
Pursuant to this scheme of cooperative self-regulation, na-
tional exchanges and brokerage associations have promulgated
rules requiring member broker-dealers to make only investment
32 Section 15A provides in pertinent part:
(a) An association of brokers and dealers may be registered as a national se-
curities association... by filing with the Commission an application for registra-
tion in such form as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe containing the rules
of the association and such other information and documents as the Commission,
by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a) (1976). In addition, subdivision (b) of section 15A provides:
(b) An association of brokers and dealers shall not be registered as a national
securities association unless the Commission determines that-
(6) The rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable princi-
ples of trade . . . facilitating transactions in securities, to remove im-
pediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a free and open market
• . . and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest. . . (7)
The rules of the association provide that... its members and persons
associated with its members shall be appropriately disciplined for viola-
tion of any provision of this chapter... by expulsion, suspension, ...
fine, censure, being suspended or barred from being associated with a
member, or any other fitting sanction.
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6)-(7) (1976).
33 See Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (N.D. Tex. 1976). See gener-
ally Rediker, supra note 7, at 15-26.
14 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1976). The directive to promulgate disciplinary rules is in
keeping with one of the goals of the Maloney Act: "[protection] of the investor and the
honest dealer alike from dishonest and unfair practices by the submarginal element in the
industry." H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1938).
1* 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (1976).
36 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)(2) (1976); see 2 L. Loss, supra note 27, at 1364.
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recommendations suited to their customers' accounts. 7 Three
principal sources of the broker's suitability obligations exist. The
balance of this Note will examine the sources of these suitability
obligations and their utility as bases for private civil suits by
investors.
THE SOURCES OF THE SUITABILrrY OBLIGATIONS
The NASD's Rules of Fair Practice, adopted in 1939, impose
an express suitability obligation on member broker-dealers. Article
III, section 2, of the Rules provides that a member's recommenda-
tion to purchase, sell, or exchange any security must be based upon
"reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suit-
able for [the] customer on the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed
by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his
financial situation and needs."8 8 The language of the NASD rule
does not define precisely the nature and extent of a broker's suit-
ability obligations. In a 1964 policy statement, however, the Associ-
ation indicated that its suitability rule was aimed at "ethical"
abuses in member-customer dealings.39 Significantly, the NASD
Board of Governors has also stated that "no affirmative obligation
to ascertain a customer's resources and needs [is] imposed upon a
salesman nor [is] the extremely difficult test of suitability imposed
upon [every transaction in] the securities business."'40 Thus, while
the NASD's suitability rule institutes some minimal ethical con-
straints and general duties of fair dealing upon its members, it
seems clear that the broker's suitability duty is to be applied flex-
ibly so as not to inhibit standard, legitimate sales practices.41
The SEC, on the other hand, has imposed a more extensive
suitability obligation on registered brokers who are not members of
a national securities association. 2 In rule 15b10-3, promulgated
-7 See notes 3-5 and accompanying text infra.
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. M, § 2, reprinted in NASD SEC. DEALERS MANUAL
(CCH) % 2,152 (1979).
" NASD, Special Report to NASD Members (Oct. 9, 1964), reprinted in NASD
MUAL (CCH) 2,152, at 2051-53 (1979). See generally Roach, The Suitability Obligations
of Brokers: Present Law and The Proposed Federal Securities Code, 25 HAsTINGS L.J. 1069,
1075-78 (1979).
1* NASD, Report to Members 1964, at 8 (1965).
41 See NASD, Special Report to NASD Members (Oct. 9, 1964), reprinted in NASD
MANUAL (CCH) % 2,152, at 2051 (1979).
41 The Securities Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 1, 78 Stat. 565 (1964),
gave the SEC rulemaking power with respect to brokers who are not members of a regis-
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pursuant to the 1964 amendments to the Act,43 the Commission
directed:
Every nonmember broker ... who recommends to a customer
the purchase, sale or exchange of any security shall have reason-
able grounds to believe that the recommendation is not unsuita-
ble for such customer on the basis of information furnished by
such customer after reasonable inquiry concerning the customer's
investment objectives, financial situation and needs, and any
other information known by such broker .... 44
By creating an affirmative duty of "reasonable inquiry," the SEC
rule apparently places more stringent suitability responsibilities on
the nonmember broker-dealer.45 In the release accompanying rule
15b10-3, the Commission stated that a broker's inquiry generally
would extend to "information concerning the customer's marital
status, the number and age of his dependents, his earnings, the
amount of his savings and life insurance, and his security holdings
and other assets. '48 The SEC stressed, however, that the broker is
tered national securities association. Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
78o(a)(1) (1976), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer... who does not make use of any
facility of a national securities exchange . . .to make use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transactions in, or
to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security... unless
such broker or dealer is registered in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1976). Subsection (b)(1) of section 15 provides in pertinent part:
A broker or dealer may be registered by filing with the Commission an application
for registration in such form and containing such information and documents con-
cerning such broker or dealer and any persons associated with such broker or
dealer as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(1) (1976).
,3 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(9) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 15(b)(9) of the Exchange Act
provides: "No broker or dealer ... shall effect any transaction in, or induce the purchase or
sale of, any security ... in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe designed to promote just and equitable principles of trade ... and, in gen-
eral, to protect investors and the public interest." 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(9) (1976).
44 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1980).
5 Lipton, The Customer Suitability Doctrine, PRACTICING LAW INSTITrrTE, FOURTH
ANNUAL INsTrruTE ON SEcuRITmS REGULATION 278 & n.16 (1973); Roach, supra note 40, at
1079. The SEC has stated that the broker's obligation under Rule 15b10-3 to make recom-
mendations that are "not unsuitable" is generally equivalent to the NASD's directive to
make only "suitable" recommendations. See SEC Exch. Act Release No. 7984, at 6 (1966).
But see Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Lipton, supra,
at 277-78.
" SEC Exch. Act Release No. 8135 (July 27, 1967), reprinted in [1966-1967 Transfer
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not under a duty of independent verification; he can rely on the
accuracy of the information furnished by the investor and need not
refrain from making a recommendation if, after reasonable inquiry,
the customer refuses to provide the information.4 '
While the rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
have no explicit suitability requirement, most courts and commen-
tators agree that the NYSE's "know-your-customer" rule also im-
poses an implied suitability obligation upon exchange members.' 8
Rule 405 of the NYSE provides that every member organization
and its employees are required to "use due diligence to learn the
essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash
and margin account accepted or carried by such organization.' 49
The NYSE Guide to Supervision and Management of Registered
Representatives and Customer Accounts indicates that prior to
making an investment recommendation, the broker must "deter-
mine pertinent facts concerning his client's situation," including
his major assets, resources, and liabilities, his investment experi-
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) S 77,459, at 82,890; see SEC Exch. Act Release No. 7984,
at 2-3 (Oct. 25, 1966). The Commission has noted, however, that the nature and extent of
the broker-dealer's duty of inquiry "will depend on all the facts and circumstances. Thus,
depending on the length of the interval between recommendations, it might be sufficient
simply to ask the customer whether there has been any material change in his circumstances
since the previous inquiry." SEC Exch. Act Release No. 8135 (July 27, 1967), reprinted in
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,459, at 82,890.
47 SEC Exch. Act Release No. 8135 (July 27, 1967), reprinted in [1966-1967 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 77,459, at 82,890.
48 See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1973); Avem Trust v.
Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1239 (7th Cir. 1969); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 137 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Nichols, The
Broker's Duty to His Customers Under Evolving Federal Fiduciary and Suitability Stan-
dards, 26 BUFALO L. REv. 435, 436 (1977); Lipton, supra note 45, at 275-76. On the other
hand, there is considerable authority to the effect that the "know-your-customer" rules are
designed primarily to protect member firms against financially irresponsible customers. See,
e.g., Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1382-83 (N.D. Tex. 1976); SPECIAL STUDY,
supra note 1, at 316; 5A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5, § 211.01[b], 9-42 n.2 (1979); 2
L. Loss, supra note 26, at 3715-16; Rediker, supra note 7, at 66 n.208; Note, The "Know-
Your-Customer" Rule of the NYSE: Liability of Broker-Dealers Under the UCC and Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 1973 DUKE L.J. 489.
49 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) % 2,405 (1980). A rule similar to NYSE Rule 405 has been en-
acted by the American Stock Exchange. See Rule 411, 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) T
9,431 (1980). The know-your-customer rules are generally read in conjunction with the ex-
changes' "fair dealing" rules as creating suitability obligations. Roach, supra note 39, at
1082-83; see 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 2,401 (1980); 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GuIDE (CCH) 9,236
(1980). NYSE Rule 401, for example, states: "Every member, member firm and member
corporation shall at all times adhere to the principles of good business practice in the con-
duct of his or its business affairs." 2 NYSE GuIDE (CCH) 2,401 (1980).
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ence, and the other securities in his portfolio °.5  Thus, like the SEC
suitability provision, the NYSE "know-your-customer" rule places
on the broker an affirmative duty of inquiry in formulating suit-
ability judgments, at least as to those customers who actively seek
investment advice. 51
JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF THE SUITABILITY ACTION
The first case to address the issue of a private right of action
for member violations of stock exchange rules was Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Bache & Co. 52 In Colonial Realty, the plaintiff alleged
50 NYSE, SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT OF REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES AND CUS-
TOMER ACCOUNTS 4-5 (1973 ed.). See generally Roach, supra note 39, at 1084-85.
11 NYSE, SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT OF REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES AND CUS-
TOMER ACCOUNTS 4-5 (1973 ed.). In addition to the existing suitability rules of the SEC,
stock exchanges, and national broker associations, the Federal Securities Code which has
been proposed by the American Law Institute also contains a suitability provision. Section
1721 of the proposed code provides:
(a) Determination of Rules to Which Section Applies-A member of or partici-
pant in a self-regulatory organization who violates a rule of the organization...
is liable to his customer for any loss caused by the violation if-
(1) the rule violated has been determined by Commission rule to be
within section 1721; or
(2) a court, except with respect to those rules determined by Commis-
sion rule not to be within section 1721, decides that a private right of
action under this Code should be recognized in accordance with the
principles of [federal] common law and equity ....
(b) Commission's Rulemaking Authority-The rules of the Commission may des-
ignate either specific self-regulatory organization . . . rules or categories of such
rules that are not within section 1721.
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1721(a)-(b), at 768-79 (1980). Thus, section 1721 of the proposed code
is an "amalgam of most of the violation approaches" utilized by the courts to assess liability.
Id. § 1721, Comment 5 at 772-73. Under the Institute's proposal, the Commission would be
authorized to determine categories of self-regulatory organization rules which, in turn,
would be a basis for civil liability. In addition, courts would be permitted to designate cer-
tain rules as actionable, applying federal common law to this issue. The section also enumer-
ates several criteria to be used in determining whether a rule may be actionable. See id.
§ 1721(c), at 769.
52 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). The issue of whether a
private right of action may be implied against an exchange or broker association itself for
failure to discipline members was a precursor to the question of broker liability for violation
of stock exchange or broker association rules. In Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944), the Second Circuit acknowledged that an exchange's cul-
pable failure to enforce rules adopted pursuant to section 6(b) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78f (1976), see note 21 supra, may give investors a federal cause of action against
the exchange. 141 F.2d at 244 (Clark, J., dissenting in part). The court denied recovery on
the ground that the plaintiff had not established a causal connection between his injury and
the failure of the exchange to enforce its rules. Id. at 239. Baird left unanswered, however,
the question whether liability may be asserted for violation of exchange rules by an ex-
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that the defendant's margin requirements violated the NASD's by-
laws and general fair dealing rule, and the NYSE Constitution and
Rules.5 3 In considering whether a private right of action for dam-
ages should lie for NYSE and NASD rule violations, the Second
Circuit found that a court must "look to the nature of the particu-
lar rule and its place in the regulatory scheme. ' ' " Judge Friendly
determined that if an NASD rule was, in effect, a substitution for
direct SEC regulation, implication of a private right of action could
be proper.55 The court dismissed the suit, however, holding that
the rules at issue "preserve[d] power to discipline members for a
wide variety of misconduct, including merely unethical behavior
which Congress could well not have intended to give rise to a legal
claim. '56 Thus, Judge Friendly concluded, there was "little reason
to believe that by requiring exchanges and dealers associations to
include such provisions in their rules Congress meant to impose a
new legal standard on members different from that long recognized
by state law."'5 7
In contrast to the "substitution test" of Colonial Realty, a
simpler analysis of the implication question was advanced by the
Seventh Circuit in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.'s In Buttrey, a broker who had been suspended from
trading for "erratic trading practices" was permitted by the defen-
dant brokerage firm to open and manage an account in favor of a
bankrupt corporation and to speculate in large stock transactions
on the customer's behalf. 9 A trustee in bankruptcy brought an ac-
tion alleging that the defendant had completely failed to investi-
gate the bankrupt's financial responsibility in violation of NYSE
Rule 405.60 The Seventh Circuit stated that "[t]he touchstone for
change member.
13 358 F.2d at 180.
Id. at 182.
"5 Id. The court stated that "the concept of supervised self-regulation is broad enough
to encompass a rule which provides what amounts to a substitute for regulation by the SEC
itself." Id.
" Id. at 182.
17 Id. Judge Friendly reasoned that a federal right of action under stock exchange rules
would inundate the federal courts with "garden-variety customer-broker suits." Id. at 183.
0 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
1, 410 F.2d at 141.
60 Id. The plaintiff alleged that Merrill Lynch had authorized the opening of the cus-
tomer's cash account without requiring any bank references or financial statements and
later converted the cash account to a margin account without investigating the bankrupt's
financial responsibility. Id.
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determining whether or not a violation of a particular rule is ac-
tionable should properly depend on its design 'for the direct pro-
tection of investors.'-61 Finding that Rule 405 was "designed to
protect investors," the court determined that an implied right of
action for violation of the rule was consistent with the purposes of
the Exchange Act. 2 The Buttrey court declined, however, to hold
that suitability violations were actionable per se.e" Instead the
court ruled that where the alleged misconduct was "tantamount to
fraud, '' " a private federal cause of action was stated, since "such a
breach of fair practice undermined the protection of investors and
surely 'plays an integral part in SEC regulation.' ,,65
Following the rationale of Colonial Realty, district courts in
the Second, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have disallowed a
private right of action for violations of NYSE and NASD suitabil-
ity rules.66 Typically, those courts have determined that while the
federal securities laws are essentially directed at fraud,e7 violations
1 Id. at 142. See also Lowenfels, Implied Liability Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules,
66 COLUM. L. REv. 12, 18-19 (1966).
62 410 F.2d at 142.
63 Id. at 143.
4Id.
" Id. at 142 (quoting Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 17 (1966)). Although the Buttrey court held that the presence or
absence of fraud was determinative of whether an implied right of action was stated, it
acknowledged the rationale of the Second Circuit in Colonial Realty by noting that the
protection of investors was an integral part of SEC regulation of exchanges and their mem-
bers. 410 F.2d at 142. Furthermore, the court relied on Colonial Realty and its progeny
when it conceded that "mere errors of judgment by a defendant might not support a federal
cause of action." Id. at 143 (citing Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 430, 431
(N.D. Cal. 1968) (dictum), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970)). The Buttrey court,
however, did not adopt the reasoning of the Colonial Realty line of cases. Finding that the
rules were aimed at unethical rather than fraudulent conduct, the Buttrey court concluded
that they could not give rise to a legal claim. 410 F.2d at 143; see Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co., 283 F. Supp. at 431. For a comprehensive discussion of the Colonial Realty and Buttrey
decisions, see Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to Its Customers for Violation of
Stock Exchange Rules, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 253 (1970); Lashbrooke, Implying a Cause of
Action for Damages: Rule Violations By Registered Exchanges and Associations, 48 U. CN.
L. REv. 949 (1979); Rediker, supra note 7.
E.g., Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292, 296-97 (S.D. Iowa
1975); Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FEm. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 95,021, at 97,581-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
295 F. Supp. 1160, 1162-63 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp.
417, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (dictum), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
67 Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,021, at 97,582 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
295 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417,
430 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (dictum), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
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by a broker of his suitability obligations sound in common-law
negligence.68 Therefore, the courts have concluded that a federal
remedy for suitability violations is inconsistent with the regulatory
scheme developed under the securities laws, and that such claims
are better suited to state court adjudication. It has been reasoned
that hindsight review of a broker's suitability judgments could
have a considerable adverse impact on the broker-customer rela-
tionship;70 that self-regulatory organizations might refrain from
promulgating and enforcing suitability rules for fear of creating a
basis for federal court damage actions;7 1 and that rules created by
exchanges and industry associations, rather than by a govern-
mental agency, are not the product of "careful deliberation and
weighing of variegated competing public interests. '7 2
A majority of courts, on the other hand, have adopted the
"tantamount to fraud" standard enunciated in Buttrey.7 While
recognizing that suitability violations are actionable, these courts
have held that the implied right of action under the suitability
rules extends only to fraudulent misdeeds.74 Those actions pre-
68 Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 95,021, at 97,582 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
69 See, e.g., Piper, Jaifray & Hopwood, Inc. v. Ladin, 399 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
In Piper, the court stated that "the Suitability Rule may form part of the negligence
concept in common law, thus clearly falling outside the strongest case for implication of a
federal cause of action." Id. at 297 (citation omitted); see Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp.
411, 420 (D. Minn. 1977).
70 Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). In its 1964 Annual Report to Members, the NASD Board of
Governors expressed concern that imposition of an affirmative obligation on a broker to
ascertain the financial capabilities and needs of each investor before making an investment
recommendation "would be unwise and impractical, and would interject the possibility of
hindsight judgment in determining whether there could conceivably have been any reasona-
ble basis for a sale or purchase." NASD, Report to Members 1964, at 8. See generally
Roach, supra note 39, at 1077.
71 Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 166 n.23 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fan. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,777 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
71 Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 166 n.23 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974).
73 See, e.g., Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Minn. 1977); Shorrock v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,251, at 92,677-78 (D. Or. 1977); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021,
1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Lange
v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
7' See Carroll v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); McMillan
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 399 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1975). The standard of conduct
sufficient to sustain a finding of fraud under the suitability rules, however, remains unset-
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mised upon mere negligence or error of judgment will not support
a federal damages action and, therefore, are subject to dismissal.7 5
Thus, it appears that the two courts which initially considered the
suitability issue did not agree upon a viable basis for implication.
While the Colonial test is in partial conformity with subsequent
Supreme Court pronouncements, 6 the Buttrey approach is not
consistent with recognized standards for implication.77 Addition-
ally, Buttrey is problematic in that the fraud requirement enun-
ciated by the court has clouded the implication question. Subse-
tled. It has been held that scienter must be shown. See, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill
& Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971). Alternatively, reckless disregard of Rule 405 of the
NYSE has been deemed sufficient to establish a violation. See Spectrum Financial Cos. v.
Marconsult, Inc., 608 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben,
598 F.2d 1017, 1024-25 (6th Cir. 1979); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1040, 1044 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Wolfson v. Baker, 444 F. Supp.
1124, 1134 (M.D. Fla. 1978). Another view is that the fraud involved in a suitability claim
must be independently cognizable under rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Architectural League v. Bar-
tos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Schonholtz v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 376 F.
Supp. 1089, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), a/f'd, 505 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1974). The uncertainty sur-
rounding the appropriate standard of liability under the suitability rules is problematic in
that it has induced some courts to consider the merits of the case before determining
whether the court has jurisdiction. See Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Minn.
1977) (dictum). This seems to be contrary to the general procedure of evaluating subject
matter jurisdiction as a threshold question. See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173, 180 (1979); Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 96 (1957).
1 See Carroll v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 430, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202
(9th Cir. 1970). Violations of NYSE or NASD suitability rules may be relevant in state-law
negligence actions. See Mercury Inv. Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160, 1163
(S.D. Tex. 1969).
See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); notes 80-92 and accompanying text infra.
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In Zagari, the court
specifically rejected the protection theory espoused in Buttrey, since, if a desire to protect
the public was the basis for implying a private right of action, any provision of the Ex-
change Act could give rise to a private remedy. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 95,777, at 90,808-09. Relying upon Judge Friendly's analysis in Colonial, the
Zagari court also refused to accept the reasoning that a purpose to benefit the public is
sufficient to meet the Colonial "substitution test." Id. at 90,811; see text accompanying
notes 51-54 supra; accord, Parsons v. Hornblower & Weks-Hemphill, Noyes, 447 F. Supp.
482, 494 (M.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). The court then
criticized the "tantamount to fraud" requirement on the ground that it forces implication to
depend on the conduct of the defendant rather than upon the nature of the rule violated.
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fan. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, at 90,809. The court further
noted that the Buttrey approach forecloses decisions on motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), until the case has
been heard on the merits because, prior to that point, the fraud cannot be determined. Id.
at 90,809.
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quent to Buttrey, courts have focused their inquiry upon
determining the degree of fraud required to sustain a violation 8
rather than upon delineating a justifiable basis for implication.
Consequently, the fraud issue has become inextricably intertwined
with the implication question. It is submitted that the court must
first establish that a private right of action exists. The fraudulent
nature of the broker's conduct is irrelevant in this regard.7 9
Colonial Realty and Buttrey, however, were superseded in
1975 by the Supreme Court's decision in Cort v. Ash,80 which ex-
pressly set forth the factors for determining the existence of an
implied private right of action. In Cort, the Supreme Court held
that, in general, an implied cause of action may be made out if (1)
the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose "especial" benefit
the statute was enacted, (2) the legislative intent grants such a
right, (3) implication of a private civil remedy would be consistent
with the legislative scheme, and (4) the cause of action is not one
which has traditionally been relegated to state law.81 The first case
to apply the Cort guidelines to private damages actions for breach
of the NASD and similar rules was Lange v. H. Hentz & Co. 2 In
Lange, a securities dealer employed by the defendant was alleged
to have manipulated the market in certain stock in order to pro-
tect his own holdings."3 When the corporation ultimately failed,
the plaintiffs, who had been fraudulently induced by the dealer not
to sell their stock, commenced a civil damages action under the
NASD suitability rule in an attempt to recoup their losses." In
denying a private right of action for the suitability claim, the
Lange court concluded that none of the four Cort criteria could be
satisfied.85 Declaring that the historical roots of the NASD rules lie
78 See, e.g., Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Minn. 1977).
79 See Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rm.
(CCH) 1 95,777 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The Zagari court resolved that if a private right of action
exists for violation of an exchange rule, then it should exist for all violations of the rule
regardless of whether the specific conduct involved appears to be fraudulent. Id. at 90,809.
80 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
81 Id. at 78.
82 418 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
83 Id. at 1378.
" Id. at 1377.
85 Id. at 1382-83. In the period since the Supreme Court's reaffirnance of the Cort
criteria in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979), several courts have
recognized that section 6 of the Exchange Act is not likely to support an implied private
right of action for suitability violations. See, e.g., Raakl, Elkins, Stroud, Suplee & Co., No.
79-3187 (E.D. Pa. June 12, 1980); Klitzman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., [1980
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in the concept of cooperative self-regulation, 6 the court held that
the NASD and similar rules protect the investing public only inci-
dentally.87 The purpose of the rules, the court stated, was the
professionalization of the securities industry and, therefore, the
group "specially benefitted from the adoption of NASD rules is
the class of securities dealers. ' ' " Second, the district judge con-
cluded that the rules were intended by the legislature as "ethical"
standards for broker conduct to be enforced by the association or
exchange itself; there was no intent to create a civil remedy.89 The
court also postulated that "vigilante enforcement" of NASD rules
would disrupt the "delicate concept of self-regulation" and thus
conflict with the general legislative scheme.90 Finally, the court ob-
served that the cause of action was one which traditionally had
been subsumed under state-law fiduciary duty and negligence con-
cepts and, therefore, was more appropriately left to state court
adjudication.9 1
Following the lead of the Lange court, several subsequent
cases have acknowledged the importance of evaluating the Cort
factors before implying a private suitability action. Consequently,
these cases have rejected the earlier analysis of the Buttrey court
as inadequate.2 In spite of the approach adopted in Lange, how-
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,627, at 98,375 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hoover v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,654, at 98,486
(E.D. Pa. 1980); Birotte v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1172,
1181 (D.N.J. 1979).
418 F. Supp. at 1382; see notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
87 418 F. Supp. at 1382.
Id. (emphasis in original).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1382-83. The court reasoned that implied civil liability could lead the NASD
"to lower its high standards of ethical guidance... thereby reduc[ing] their efficacy." Id. at
1382.
91 Id. at 1383. The district court asserted that an implied federal cause of action for
suitability violations could erode state-defined fiduciary duties and negligence concepts. Id.
On the other hand, the Lange court noted, there was "little likelihood that federal policy
would be thwarted" by allowing the interplay between NASD self-regulation and state neg-
ligence and fiduciary duties to continue. Id.
92 See, e.g., Siedman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 1233,
1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,777, at 90,808-09 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The Zagari court compared the "sub-
stitution test" of Colonial Realty, see notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra, and the
"protection of investors" theory of Buttrey, see notes 61-65 and accompanying text supra,
with the guidelines set forth in Cort. [1976-1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 95,777, at
90,809. The court concluded that the Buttrey standard encompassed only one of the Cort
factors-whether the plaintiff was a member of the class for whose benefit the rule was
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ever, the majority of post-Cort suitability cases have ignored the
guidelines set forth in the Cort opinion.93 The preoccupation with
fraud, initiated by the Buttrey decision,94 apparently has been
largely responsible for this inadvertent disregard of the mandated
implication inquiries.s Consequently, even subsequent to the Cort
decision, a potential basis for implication remains unidentified.98
Nevertheless, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,97 the Supreme
Court affirmed the importance of evaluating the Cort factors, in-
structing courts to pay particular attention to the legislative in-
tent."8 In light of this pronouncement, the possibility of discover-
ing a basis for implication under section 6 of the Exchange Act
appears unlikely- --99 as several post-Touche Ross courts have
adopted. Id.; see Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411, 417 (D. Minn. 1977); Lange v. H. Hentz
& Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Tex. 1976). The Zagari court determined, however,
that the Colonial Realty test "deal[s] directly" with all four Cort factors. [1976-1977 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, at 90,809.
93 See Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 168-69
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); Rof v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F.
Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), modified, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1039 (1978).
" See notes 76-79 and accompanying text supra.
9' See Crt v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78; see notes 80-81 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 76-79 and accompanying text supra.
442 U.S. 560 (1979).
Id. at 575-76 (1979); accord, Transamerica Mtge. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
23 (1979). In Touche Ross, the Court addressed the question of whether a private right of
action may be implied under section 17(a) of the Exchange Act. Although recognizing the
existence of the four factors outlined in Cort, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that "[t]he
central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implica-
tion, a private cause of action." 442 U.S. at 575. The Court declared that "[t]he source of
plaintiffs' rights must be found, if at all, in the substantive provisions of the 1934 Act which
they seek to enforce." Id. at 577. Accordingly, the Court stated that if the legislative history
is silent, the inquiry whether Congress intended to create a private right of action is "an-
swered in the negative" and proceeds no further. Id. at 576. Mere allusions to the" 'reme-
dial purposes' of the 1934 Act will not justify reading a provision 'more broadly than its
language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit."' Id. at 578 (quoting SEC v. Sloan,
436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978)). Thus, the Touche Ross decision appears to undermine the But-
trey protection theory. The Court clearly recognized that it is not the judiciary's place to
improve upon a federal statutory scheme. If a private action is, indeed, warranted, "Con-
gress must provide it." Id. at 579.
99 Section 6 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) (1976), the "substantive basis" of
the suitability claim, delineates the requirements which must be satisfied by an exchange
seeking registration as a "national securities exchange." See Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co.,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777 at 90,806; note 21 and ac-
companying text supra. The language of section 6 does not specifically declare any conduct
to be unlawful, nor does it expressly provide a private right of action for violation of a rule
promulgated in accordance with the section. The purpose of the section is merely to set
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recognized. 100
THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION REJECTED
Private civil relief for violations of a broker's suitability obli-
gations would supplement the already existing enforcement and
disciplinary powers of the SEC, 101 the exchange arbitration proce-
dure,102 and the more traditional private antifraud remedies under
the Exchange Act.103 It is submitted, however, that civil liability
for suitability violations was not contemplated by either Congress
or the self-regulatory organizations, and is not supported by the
general regulatory scheme of the Act.
forth procedural registration requirements while simultaneously insuring that the exchanges
will be supplied with a workable means of self-regulation. See Jennings, supra note 15, at
670.
Much of the legislative history surrounding section 6 reflects a preoccupation with the
concept of self-regulation. See S. Rm. No. 1517, 75th Cong., 2d Seas. 4 (1938); Comment,
Implication of Civil Liability Under the New York Stock Exchange Rules and Listing
Agreement, 22 VI.L. L. Rav. 130, 130 n.2 (1976). Examination of both the language of sec-
tion 6 and its legislative history, however, does not reveal any congressional intent to create
a private right of action for violation of an exchange rule. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,
614 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1980).
100 E.g., Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980); Raakl v. Elkins,
Stroud, Suplee & Co., No. 79-3187 (E.D. Pa., June 12, 1980); Klitzman v. Bache Halsey
Stuart Shields, Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,627, at 98,375
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hoover v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,654, at 98,486 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Interestingly, SEC Rule 15b10-3, the Commis-
sion's suitability rule applicable to nonmember broker-dealers, has been conspicuously ig-
nored by private litigants as a source of implied liability. It is generally agreed by the com-
mentators, however, that a strong argument could be made for an implied cause of action
under the SEC's suitability provision. See Roach, supra note 38, at 1092-93 n.511. See also
Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied
Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNSu L.Q. 633, 637-38 (1966). To date, however,
there has been no reported case law ruling on the existence of a private right of action under
Rule 15b10-3. Accord, Roach, supra note 39, at 1081.
'o See 15 U.S.C. §9 78o(4), 78s(h) (1976 & Supp. M 1979). Section 78s(h) authorizes
the SEC to revoke the registration of the self-regulatory organization, id. § 78s(h)(1), to
suspend any member of the self-regulatory organization from participation therein, id. §
78s(h)(2), to suspend any person from being associated with a member of the national secur-
ities exchange, id. § 78s(h)(3), and to remove from office or censure any officer or director of
the self-regulatory organization, id. § 78s(h)(4). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1976) which,
inter alia, authorizes the SEC to "make such investigations as it deems necessary to deter-
mine whether any person has violated ... the rules or regulations [of the Securities Ex-
change Act], the rules of a national securities exchange or registered securities association of
which such person is a member ... ."
102 See Rule 619 of the American Stock Exchange, 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GuDE (CCH)
9,551H (1980); Rule 601 of the New York Stock Exchange, 2 N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUmE
(CCH) 1 2,601 (1980).
103 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
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The statutory basis for implied civil liability for breach of the
suitability rules is found in sections 6 and 15A of the Exchange
Act. These sections prohibit broker conduct inconsistent with "just
and equitable principles of trade."'104 The legislative history of the
Exchange Act does not address expressly the issue of whether ex-
change and broker association rules promulgated pursuant to sec-
tions 6 and 15A were intended to be civilly actionable by private
litigants. It is unlikely, however, that Congress would have created
a federal cause of action on behalf of an apparently limitless class
of plaintiffs based on such a general, ill-defined standard of liabil-
ity.1 0 5 Furthermore, many courts as well as SEC interpretive
materials have suggested that the suitability and "know-your-cus-
tomer" rules of the self-regulatory organizations are to be regarded
as "ethical" guidelines, °10  and that the SEC's suitability rule was
104 Securities Exchange Act §§ 6(b), 15A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), 78o-3(b)(4) (1976 &
Supp. Im 1979).
105 See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
The argument that Congress could not have intended to create a cause of action in favor of
an unlimited class of plaintiffs seems particularly cogent in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions which have narrowed plaintiffs' standing to sue under rule 10b-5, see Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), and have raised the standard of culpa-
bility in a private action under the rule, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976). See notes 125-128 and accompanying text infra. One author, however, has taken the
contrary position:
Still, 'conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade' is the exact
language adopted by Congress, and though the standard of liability be broad, it is
the direct creature of legislative fiat. Further, if under Section 15A(b)(4) of the
1934 Act a broker can be barred from the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers [NASD] for 'conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade,'
it would not seem any more drastic to grant a private right of action to an ag-
grieved investor for a violation of rules embodying this same standard.
Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. Rxv. 12, 19
(1966) (footnote omitted).
106 See SPEcLx STUDY, supra note 1, at 309 (purpose of NASD rules is to supply bro-
kers with "general ethical standard"). Furthermore, in SEC Exch. Act Release No. 9420,
Feb. 11, 1972, reprinted in [Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 25,529, the Com-
mission recognized and, for the most part, sanctioned "the standards of conduct and general
interpretive principles which have been prescribed by the NASD for its members." Id.; see
Roach, supra note 39, at 1078-79 n.41. The policy statement issued by the NASD clarifying
its suitability rule, in turn, speaks generally of "ethical standards" resulting in "disciplinary
action." NASD, Special Report to NASD Members (Oct. 9, 1964), reprinted in [1976]
NASD MANUAL (CCH) % 2,152, at 2,051. Several courts in denying a private right of action
have agreed also that exchange and broker association rules merely set forth ethical stan-
dards and therefore do not sustain a legal remedy in federal court. See, e.g., Lange v. H.
Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Jenny v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,021, at 97,582 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Avery v. Moffatt, 187 Misc. 576, 592, 55 N.Y.S.2d 215, 228 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945). See
generally Rediker, supra note 7, at 15-26.
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meant to impose only comparable ethical constraints on nonmem-
ber broker-dealers. 107 Indeed, it is arguable that the suitability
principle, as embodied in the SEC, NYSE, and NASD rules, may
simply be a statement of public policy, merely intended by the
Commission and rulemaking boards to articulate and institutional-
ize the Exchange Act's general philosophy of fair dealing.108
Moreover, it is submitted that a private right of action for
suitability violations is barred by section 27 of the Exchange
Act.10 9 Specifically, it appears that the drafters of the '34 Act failed
to provide for federal subject matter jurisdiction over violations of
stock exchange and broker association rules. Section 27 of the Ex-
change Act vests the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction of
"all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liabil-
ity or duty created by [the Exchange Act] or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder."110 The Seventh Circuit 1 1 and several lower fed-
eral courts have reasoned that since disciplinary rules must be
adopted by the self-regulatory organizations as a precondition to
registration with the SEC, "these rules were created by direct com-
mand of statute.1 1 2 Thus, the courts have concluded that the fail-
ure of a broker to make suitable investment recommendations is a
107 See SEC Exch. Act Release No. 9420 Feb. 11, 1972, reprinted in [Transfer Binder],
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 25,592, at 18,578; Roach, supra note 39, at 1078-79 n.41. See
generally Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
1964 DuKE L.J. 706, 822-28. Thus, a merely ethical duty comparable to that imposed on
NASD members, see note 107 and accompanying text supra, would also apply to nonmem-
ber broker-dealers subject to regulation under rule 15b10-3. In fact, one court has suggested
that the adoption of a suitability rule by the SEC was an attempt to encourage nonmember
firms to join a national broker association, where their suitability obligation would be only
an ethical one. See Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,777 at 90,811 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
108 See Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to Its Customer for Violation of a
Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FoRDHAM L. REv. 253, 279 (1970) ("some of the
New York Stock Exchange rules seem to have been used solely as a convenient depository
for new ideas").
109 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976); accord, Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178,
181-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,777, at 90,806 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Lange v. H.
Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1379-80 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Lowenfela, Implied Liabilities
Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 12, 22-23 (1966); MacLean, Brokers'
Liability for Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DEN. L.J. 63, 64-65 (1970).
110 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
... Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
112 Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678, 681 (D. Wyo.
1975).
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violation of a "duty created by [the Exchange Act]. '113 It is sug-
gested, however, that the only duty created by sections 6 and 15A
is the duty of the self-regulatory organization to register with the
Commission prior to effecting any transactions in securities.1" The
promulgation and enforcement of suitability rules, on the other
hand, are preliminary and independent obligations, violation of
which can lead only to administrative sanctions.115 It is submitted,
therefore, that a broker's suitability responsibilities are not
equivalent to the duties which can give rise to federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction under the Exchange Act.
The courts and commentators also agree that section 27's
grant of federal jurisdiction over violations of "rules and regula-
tions" does not create subject matter jurisdiction over breaches of
suitability rules.""' In Colonial Realty, the Second Circuit found
that "rules and regulations" in section 27 include only those rules
promulgated by the SEC itself.11 7 This conclusion is bolstered by
the fact that other sections of the '34 Act specifically refer to rules
of stock exchanges, 8 while the language of section 27 omits any
223 See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389
F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo. 1975); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
114 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976 & Supp. 11 1979); Bell v. J. D. Winer & Co., 392 F.
Supp. 646, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Brodsky, Liabilities Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, [1979] PRACTICmG LAW INsTrruTE MONOGRAPH, BROKER-DEALER LLrrnmy 47, 60.
115 Bell v. J. D. Winer & Co. 392 F. Supp. 646, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
"' See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181-82 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, at 90,806 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F.
Supp. 1376, 1379-80 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Rediker, supra note 7, at 63.
217 358 F.2d at 181-82. In United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1978), the
court clearly rejected the contention that the NASD was merely an extension of the SEC:
The Court must conclude that the NASD is not part of government .... To
hold otherwise would be to eliminate a bulwark of our economic regulatory
scheme, for there would be no need for a NASD if it were in effect a lower level of
the SEC. Although private, it plays an important role in the scheme of securities
regulation. It allows the securities industry to keep its own house clean and holds
back the seemingly overwhelming tide of government supervision.
Id. at 330; accord, Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1378-79 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
Similarly, in Nelson v. Hench, 428 F. Supp. 411 (D. Minn. 1977), the court held that ex-
change and broker association rules do not carry the force of federal law. Id. at 420; see
MacLean, Brokers' Liability for Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DEN. L.J. 63,
74-75 (1970). But see Lashbrooke, Implying a Cause of Action for Damages: Rule Viola-
tions by Registered Exchanges and Associations, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 949, 957 (1979).
11s See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1976). Section 29 of the Exchange Act provides in
pertinent part: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive com-
pliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:493
such reference.11 Furthermore, a 1975 amendment to the Ex-
change Act indicates that although the SEC may "amend" the
rules of a self-regulatory organization, such an amendment "shall
not be considered to be a rule of the Commission. 1 20 It appears,
therefore, that the jurisdictional section of the Exchange Act pre-
cludes implication of a private right of action for violations of ex-
change and broker association suitability rules by failing to provide
a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction.1 21
In addition, developments in implied-rights cases under rule
10b-51 22 indicate that merely negligent misconduct, encompassed
rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void." Id. (emphasis added).
"' Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,777, at 90,806 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp.
1376, 1379-80 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
120 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c)(4)(C) (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
11 For the same reason that exchange and broker association rules do not qualify as
"duties" created by federal law or as rules or regulations thereunder, see notes 110-116 and
accompanying text supra, it is submitted that the federal district courts do not have subject
matter jurisdiction of suitability claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Section 1331 vests
the district courts with original jurisdiction of civil actions "aris[ing] under the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976), as amended by Pub.
L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369. Although sections 6 and 19 of the Exchange Act provide that
promulgation of disciplinary rules and procedures by self-regulatory bodies is a prerequisite
to registration with the SEC, the rulemaking function of the exchanges and associations is
an undertaking distinct from their duties to register under federal law. See notes 19-37 and
accompanying text supra. In addition, the fact that exchange rules predated the enactment
of the federal securities laws, see notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra, lends credence
to the proposition that the rules of the self-regulatory organizations are not "federal laws."
Indeed, if direct regulation of broker conduct were desired, the SEC could adopt such rules
as Commission rules. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1721 (1980); note 51 supra.
22 Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), of the Securities Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the malls, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to section 10(b),
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
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in the suitability concepts of due diligence and reasonableness,12
may not properly serve as a basis for private relief. In Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder,12 4 the Supreme Court held that a private
right of action under rule 10b-5 did not lie in the absence of scien-
ter, an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 125 It seems, there-
fore, that implication of a suitability cause of action sounding in
negligence would resurrect a basis of liability expressly rejected by
the Hochfelder Court.126 Furthermore, a negligence cause of action
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
12 See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
124 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder, the plaintiffs had been induced by the president
of an investment firm to invest in nonexistent "escrow accounts." Id. at 189. In bringing suit
under rule 10b-5, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant accounting firm had aided the
president by negligently failing to conduct proper audits. Id. at 190.
5 Id. at 193. Prior to the Hochfelder decision, the circuit courts of appeals were in
conflict as to whether negligence was sufficient to support a 10b-5 claim. Compare White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1974) with Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), reh. denied, 430 U.S.
976 (1977). In rendering its decision, the Hochfelder Court considered the statutory history
of rule 10b-5 as well as the legislative history of section 10(b). 425 U.S. at 196-206. Relying
on a Senate report which stated that "[tihe defendant may escape liability by showing that
the statement was made in good faith," id. at 206 (quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 12-13 (1934) (emphasis supplied by the Court)), the Hochfelder Court concluded that
the term "manipulate" as used in the statute "connotes intentional or willful conduct,
designed to deceive or defraud investors." 425 U.S. at 199. The Court expressly declined to
rule, however, on whether reckless conduct in some instances may be sufficient to sustain
civil liability under 10b-5. Id. at 194 n.12.
22" See Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,777, at 90,812 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In Zagari, the court disallowed a private right of
action under Rule 411 of the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), which states in pertinent
part: "Every member, member firm or member corporation shall use due diligence to learn
the essential facts relative to every customer and to every order or account accepted."
AMEX R.411, reprinted in [1978] 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 1 9,431, at 2,647. The
district judge reasoned that an implied right of action under the AMEX know-your-cus-
tomer rule would permit many types of negligent conduct no longer actionable under rule
10b-5 to become cognizable in federal court. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,777, at 90,812. Furthermore, the court stated, "there [is] no need to imply a
private right of action for violations of [rule 411] since such [fraudulent conduct] [is] action-
able under rule 10b-5 itself." Id. Additionally, the Zagari court suggested that an implied
right of action under the exchange rule would circumvent the "purchase or sale" require-
ment of rule lOb-5, id.; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975);
that "garden variety" customer-broker complaints would, through implied liability, gain
standing in federal courts, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,777, at
90,812; and that implied liability would deprive state courts of the opportunity to adjudicate
customer-broker cases, undermine the availability of exchange arbitration as a remedy,
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based on suitability rules would permit plaintiffs to circumvent tht
strict procedural limitations which accompany other negligence
based remedies in the Exchange Act. 127 Therefore, in order t(
maintain the integrity of the rule 10b-5 action and consistencq
within the overall legislative scheme, claims based on unsuitabli
broker recommendations should not be cognizable in the absenc(
of more culpable conduct.
In view of the fact that courts addressing the issue have seem
ingly imposed a fraud standard for broker liability,12 8 it is submit
ted that fraudulent suitability violations, committed with scientei
are redressable in federal court under rule 10b-5. Since an estab
lished remedy for fraud exists, therefore, a separate cause of actior
under stock exchange or broker association rules is superfluous.'12
It seems that a plaintiff claiming a willful or reckless disregard's
of the suitability rules could successfully satisfy the elements o:
the 10b-5 action in order to establish broker liability. A plaintif
suing under rule 10b-5 claiming unsuitable investment recommen
dations would have to allege that the defendant either willfully oi
with reckless disregard for the truth, misrepresented or omitted t(
state a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of f
overburden the federal courts, and "chill" self-regulation by the exchange, id.
127 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976).
28 See, e.g., Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160 (8th Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 161
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner A
Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 143 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Plunkett v
Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 890 (D. Conn. 1976).
129 See Birotte v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1172, 117
(D.N.J. 1979); Plunkett v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 890 (D. Conn
1976); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)'
95,777, at 90,812 (N.D. Cal. 1976); note 126 supra; cf. Bush v. Bruns Nordman & Co., [1972
1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,674, at 93,007-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (rull
405 violation "inextricably linked" with section 10(b) claim). See also Clark v. John Lamuli
Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1978). The notion that suitability principles an
subsumed within rule 10b-5 is consistent with the trend of the courts to turn to the rule fo
guidance in adjudicating suitability claims. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co.
424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S
1039 (1978); Schonholtz v. American Stock Exch., 376 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd
505 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1974).
'0 Several courts have embraced a "reckless disregard" standard for suitability viola
tions, see Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1977); Wolfson 'Y
Baker, 444 F. Supp. 1124, 1134 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F
Supp. 1021, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 103
(1978), noting that Hochfelder did not preclude a 10b-5 action premised on reckless con
duct. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1977).
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security.131 A fact is deemed material if a reasonable person would
attach importance to it in arriving at his investment decision.132
Since the broker normally stands in a relation of expertise vis-a-vis
the average investor, it is likely that a customer will attach impor-
tance to his broker's investment recommendations, thereby satisfy-
ing the materiality element. s The 10b-5 plaintiff must also estab-
lish that he justifiably relied on his broker's misrepresentations or
omissions.14 In essence, the investor must prove that the defen-
dant's advice was a "'substantial factor"' in determining the
course of conduct which resulted in his loss 3 5 or, in the case of an
omission, that he "would have been influenced to act differently" if
all material information had been revealed to him.138 Since the gra-
vamen of a suitability claim is that the customer has incurred in-
jury as a result of transactions effected in reliance on his broker's
investment recommendations, it is submitted that the reliance re-
quirement will almost inevitably be met. Next, it must be estab-
lished that the defendant's misstatements or omissions were made
181 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977);
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 733 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
"' See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
3 See Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo.
1975). In Geyer, the plaintiff investors were induced to purchase almost $95,000 worth of
securities based on their broker's representation that such was the minimum amount they
could procure. Id. at 680. In reality, the securities were available in face amounts of $25,000.
Id. The court noted that the "'plaintiffs reposed particular trust and confidence"' in the
broker's recommendations. Id.
IN See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735-37 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968). The reliance element of the 10b-5 cause of action is addressed to the issue of causa-
tion in the sense that "the defendant's wrong must have been the cause of the plaintiff's
harm." Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955
(1977).
"I Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). A customer's reliance on
his broker's suitability judgments may vary, of course, depending upon whether the account
is discretionary or nondiscretionary. When an investor opens a discretionary account, he
relinquishes complete control of the account to his broker. Naturally, in this instance, the
investor has placed complete reliance on the broker's expertise and ability to make suitable
and appropriate investment decisions. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417,
432 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1970). Where a nondiscretionary
account is involved, however, the investor retains ultimate control over the decisions affect-
ing his portfolio. See Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1069-70 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
"' Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d at 735 (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,
463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)); see Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895,
904 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 26, at 1765.
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"in connection with the purchase or sale" of a security."' Accord-
ing to the language of the suitability rules, a broker's suitability
obligations attach only to recommendations to purchase, sell, or
exchange any security. The situation appears unforeseeable, there-
fore, in which a suitability action would not arise "in connection
with" a purchase or sale.1 8 Finally, the plaintiff in a 10b-5 action
must prove that damage has resulted from the defendant's fraudu-
lent behavior.1 89 In suitability cases, while the measure of damages
presents a complex issue,140 the fact of damage itself is usually not
in dispute. Thus, in the event that broker misconduct rises to the
level of scienter or reckless disregard, it is submitted that the
plaintiff-investor could successfully meet the elements of the 10b-5
cause of action."'
CONCLUSION
In view of the recent Supreme Court pronouncements address-
ing the private right of action issue, it has become apparent that
the suitability claim will be deemed appropriate only where the
judiciary has discerned a clear legislative intent to create an im-
plied private right. The legislative history surrounding the promul-
gation of the suitability rules, however, does not reveal an intent to
create civil liability but, rather, discloses a scheme designed to es-
'- 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980); see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 887
(E.D. Pa. 1978).
"I See notes 2-8 and accompanying text supra.
Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
140 See generally Brodsky, Measuring Damages in Churning and Suitability Cases, 6
SEC. REG. L.J. 157 (1978). Since the standard of liability sufficient to sustain the plaintiffs
claim is generally dispositive in suitability cases, there is very little case law regarding the
proper measure of damages. See, e.g., Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164,
169 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977); Birotte v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (D.N.J. 1979); Sacks v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 434 F.
Supp. 37, 39 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd, 593 F.2d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1978). One district court has
awarded damages on a suitability cause of action. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co.,
424 F. Supp. 1021, 1045-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). On appeal, however, the circuit court based its
decision on a theory of "aiding and abetting" and thus did not reach the issue of damages
on the suitability claim. 570 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
141 The mere fact that a suitability rule violation may give rise to a rule 10b-5 cause of
action, does not mean that a plaintiff would be likely to recover on the merits. Since rule
10b-5 is clearly a fraud-oriented provision, any degree of broker negligence, whether it be
"gross, grave or inexcusable-cannot serve as substitute for scienter." McLean v. Alexander,
599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979). It is a rare instance where the broker conduct alleged in
a suitability claim does, in fact, rise to the level of actual fraud.
THE SUITABILITY RULE
tablish ethical standards of broker conduct. Moreover, the absence
of legislative intent is not the sole factor militating against implica-
tion of the suitability action. This Note has asserted that the But-
trey "Protection Theory," upon which some courts have relied as a
basis for implication, does not conform with the standard enunci-
ated in Cort v. Ash, and, thus, is inadequate. Additionally, the
Hochfelder Court's refusal to premise rule 10b-5 liability upon
merely negligent conduct stands as some indication that a greater
standard of culpability would likewise be required in a suitability
claim. Furthermore, since fraudulent conduct in the purchase or
sale of a security is cognizable independently under rule 10b-5,
fraudulent suitability violations, committed with scienter, are
redressable under existing antifraud remedies. The need for imply-
ing a right of action under NASD, NYSE, or SEC Rules, therefore,
has been obviated. Finally, the propriety of federal subject matter
jurisdiction under section 27 of the Exchange Act has been ques-
tioned and rejected. Thus, "[tihe federal securities laws [were not
intended as] a panacea for all losses suffered on the stock market
upon [the] recommendation of brokers. '142 It has been submitted,
however, that while negligence is insufficient to support a claim for
implied federal liability, an ethical breach of suitability duties may
be relevant evidence in a common-law negligence, breach of fiduci-
ary duty, or breach of contract action. In light of these considera-
tions, therefore, it appears that if the Supreme Court were to view
the suitability issue today, the trend toward limitation of implied
remedies would be continued.
Kathy Connelly
142 Van Alen v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd, 560 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1977).
1981]
